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Abstract 
Although the ozone layer is vital to life on Earth, as a common resource it has been the 
subject of rational exploitation. With ozone depletion a global (rather than merely regional) 
problem, measures to address it have necessarily been international efforts. The international 
treaty that addressed ozone depletion, the Montreal Protocol (with its subsequent amendments), 
has widely been hailed as a success. However,  the triumphs of the Montreal Protocol are 
inseparable from its Multilateral Fund, whose creation was a prerequisite for developing nations, 
including juggernauts China and India, to ratify the Protocol.  
Since its inception the Fund has supplied over $2.5 billion to initiatives that support the 
phase-out of ozone-depleting chemicals in developing nations. These projects have increasingly 
employed market mechanisms to achieve efficient results, and have generated positive profits for 
participating firms. Funded initiatives have included upgrading capital, educating maintenance 
workers, production buyouts, public awareness, and institutional strengthening. Aside from 
ensuring the success of the overall Protocol, this last item will likely be the Multilateral Fund’s 
most enduring legacy, as inherent shortcomings of the Fund have largely been attributed to its 
status as a pioneering financial mechanism.  
The Multilateral Fund has broken new ground in international environmental regulation 
and shown that success on ecological issues is indeed possible at the global level, leading many 
to hope that the Fund will serve as a model for future mechanisms to address climate change. 
While the more complex chemistry and economics of climate change make such a ready 
duplication of the Multilateral Fund’s success unlikely, the Fund’s role in strengthening 
 institutions that address ecological concerns has undoubtedly smoothed the way for future 
international environmental action.   
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CHAPTER 1 - The Ozone Layer: Global Public Good 
Saving the Ozone Layer 
Human pollution has damaged many parts of Earth’s ecology, but one type of pollution 
that is no longer frequently brought up as a cause for concern is depletion of the ozone layer, one 
of the few international environmental challenges that have been successfully addressed. The 
agreement responsible for saving the ozone layer was the Montreal Protocol and its subsequent 
amendments. Although stratospheric ozone levels will not make a full recovery until decades 
into the future, the Protocol has been successful in stemming further damage. But any story of 
the Montreal Protocol’s success would be incomplete without inclusion of the agreement’s 
Multilateral Fund, a mechanism through which industrialized nations have transferred over $2.5 
billion to assist less developed nations in transitioning away from the use of ozone-depleting 
substances. To solve a truly globally problem like ozone depletion required a global solution, and 
the Multilateral Fund provided the political carrot necessary for developing nations to agree to 
solve a problem to which they had not been major contributors. By providing direct monetary 
assistance, the Multilateral Fund has established a paradigm possibility for international relations 
in international economics. First though, some knowledge of the physical properties of ozone 
will help to make the economic issues more clear.   
The Chemistry of Ozone 
Most oxygen in the Earth's atmosphere occurs as diatomic oxygen, molecules that are 
formed by a pair of oxygen atoms. This is  the oxygen we breathe. In contrast, ozone is a 
molecule that is also made up solely of oxygen atoms, but has three oxygen atoms rather than 
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two and is much more reactive. Ozone occurs naturally in the Earth's atmosphere, but at a much 
lower rate than diatomic oxygen.  
The density of ozone is not uniform throughout the atmosphere; the highest 
concentrations are found near the Earth's surface and at an elevation of 15 to 30 km above sea 
level. Low-level (tropospheric) ozone  is emitted at ground level by human-generated activity. 
Such ozone is a localized or regional pollutant that irritates both plant and animal life (vanLoon 
and Duffy 2005).  
However, high-elevation (stratospheric) ozone is vital to almost all life on Earth. This is 
ozone one speaks of when referring to the “ozone layer.” Although not truly a distinct layer of 
the atmosphere, stratospheric ozone screen out much of the sun's ultraviolet radiation that would 
damage cell life if it were not filtered out by the upper atmosphere. The chart below from the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration shows the change in ozone presence with 
respect to altitude.  
Figure 1.1 Ozone density in the atmosphere with respect to altitude (NOAA et al. 1999) 
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Ozone in the stratosphere is frequently disassembled (broken into an oxygen atoms) and 
regenerated (recombined from oxygen atoms) by natural processes, but this balance has been 
threatened by human production of chemicals that deplete ozone. 
Many ozone-depleting chemicals initially appeared as wonder substances that were 
valued for their non-toxicity and lack of reactivity with other chemicals. However, this inertness 
allowed the chemicals to exist in the atmosphere until reaching the stratosphere. Once at high 
elevations and exposed to increased solar radiation, ozone-depleting chemicals break up and 
release highly reactive components. These compounds are capable of staying in the upper 
atmosphere for over a hundred years, acting as catalysts for the repeated destruction of ozone 
around the globe, regardless of where they were initially released.  
Economic Background: (Global) Public Goods and the Tragedy of the 
Commons 
Economics recognizes some products and services as ill-suited to be provided by the 
private market. These items are termed “public goods” and are identified by non-rivalry and non-
excludability. Non-rivalry occurs when one person's consumption of something does not affect 
another person's enjoyment of the same. An example could be consumer protection legislation: 
one person benefiting from rigorous testing of prescription medications does not affect anyone 
else's enjoyment of safe medicines. Non-excludability takes place when it is unreasonably hard 
to choose who receives the benefits of a good or, alternatively, when it is unreasonably difficult 
to prohibit non-paying individuals from benefiting from an item. (Everyone downstream from a 
dam will benefit from flood control, regardless of whether or not they paid the taxes to construct 
it.) Many public goods are provided by the government, but most are “impure” public goods in 
that they are excludable or rival to some extent.  
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Some   public goods  are provided freely provided by the environment, the ozone layer 
being one such case.  However, the free and unowned character of natural resources like the 
atmosphere can be a double-edged sword.  
Biologist Garrett Hardin (1968) coined the phrase “tragedy of the commons” to describe 
how, given a common resource available free of charge, rational parties will attempt to capture 
as much of the resource as possible. With all actors attempting to maximize their share, the 
resource will be depleted and become available to no one. Hardin writes that the problem occurs 
in reverse in with pollution, where:  
“It is not a question of taking something out of the commons, but of putting 
something in. … The calculations of utility are much the same as before. The 
rational man finds that his share of the cost of the wastes he discharges into the 
commons is less than the cost of purifying his wastes before releasing them. Since 
this is true for everyone, we are locked into a system of ‘fouling our own nest,’ so 
long as we behave only as independent, rational, free-enterprisers.”  
Such tragedies of common resources are frequently countered by government 
establishment and enforcement of private property rights. The Coase Theorem implies that 
government regulation will not be necessary if private property rights are established. However, 
this result holds best when there are few parties involved and the dimensions of the externality 
(pollution) are well defined. Even if it were possible to assign private property rights to slices of 
the ozone layer, it would be impossible to identify exactly which polluters were responsible for 
damaging one’s personal ozone (Rosen and Gayer 2008). 
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While localized pollution may be addressed on a national or regional level, ozone-
depleting substances act on a global level. This fact necessitated a worldwide international 
response.   
The Montreal Protocol 
Scientists had been concerned about the possibility of ozone depletion as early as the 
1960s, when concern centered on the emissions of high-flying supersonic aircraft, but it was not 
until the mid-1970s that a link between certain chemicals and ozone depletion was confirmed. 
The discovery of an “ozone hole” over Antarctica helped verify the link between certain 
chemicals and ozone depletion, and the dramatic story helped bring the issue to public attention. 
(The “hole” in the ozone layer consisted of a reduced concentration of ozone over Antarctica, not 
an absolute lack of ozone. It would therefore be more analogous to a hole in the ground than a 
hole in a window.) 
Concern in industrialized nations about ozone destruction led to the Vienna Convention 
for the Protection of the Ozone Layer in 1985, a generalized agreement with no regulatory teeth. 
Following groundwork laid by the Vienna meeting, the Montreal Protocol on Substances That 
Deplete the Ozone Layer was agreed upon two years later. The Montreal Protocol laid out 
specific chemicals to be prohibited and deadlines by which they were to be phased out, allowing 
different timeframes for industrialized and less-developed nations. States that emitted less than .3 
kilograms of ozone-depleting substances per capita were addressed by the fifth article of the 
Protocol and came to be known as Article 5 nations. However, the timeframe concessions 
offered by the original Montreal Protocol were not enough to convince most developing nations 
to sign it. The Protocol also prohibited the trade of ozone-depleting substances between nations 
party to the Montreal Protocol and non-party nations in an attempt to avoid free riding. 
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After the Montreal Protocol agreement, scientific evidence increasingly revealed that the 
rate and magnitude of ozone depletion had been underestimated. The Protocol was designed to 
be updated and revised as necessary, so amendments led to continuous expansion and 
strengthening of the treaty in the following 20 years. The parties met to bump-up the deadlines 
banning the use of ozone-depleting chemicals, add new chemicals to the list of those being 
phased out, and develop other means to ensure the success of the treaty's intent (vanLoon and 
Duffy 2005).  
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CHAPTER 2 - Creation of the Multilateral Fund 
Establishment of the Multilateral Fund 
One of the Montreal Protocol’s unique strengths is the fact that it was designed to be 
easily reopened and adjusted based on regularly scheduled scientific, economic, environmental, 
and technological assessments. The first of such changes to the Montreal Protocol were made at 
the 1990 meeting of the parties in London (Benedick 2007).  
Some discussions revolved around scientifically-based concerns about which chemicals 
would need to be phased out and when, but it was also at this meeting that the geopolitical South, 
led by India and China, made clear that it would not follow developed nations in lock-step 
without economic assistance in replacing ozone-depleting substances. These demands resulted in 
the creation of the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol, a 
mechanism to provide technical and monetary assistance. With the Multilateral Fund on the table 
the Montreal Protocol was finally accepted by major developing nations.  
The London amendments to the Montreal Protocol were not scheduled to take effect until 
January 1992. However, it was agreed that an Interim Fund be established in 1991 to help realize 
the promise of the Multilateral Fund financing prior to the Amendment officially entering into 
force (Kelly 2004).  
The Role of China and India in the Fund's creation 
Although developed nations had moved quickly to replacements for ozone-depleting 
chemicals (many doing so even before signing the Montreal Protocol), the transition was not 
embraced as readily or as rapidly in the developing world. This was partly because of the 10-year 
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window that the Montreal Protocol allowed less developed countries “because they faced 
financial, technical, and institutional difficulties that wealthy nations did not share.” However, 
the burdens of transition were not distributed equally, but “were magnified in China and India, 
which, unlike most low-income countries, had significant [ozone-depleting substance] 
production capacity and enormous demand for commodities containing discredited substances, 
particularly the widely-used coolant chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs)” (Sims 1996). 
In fact, the Asian giants had opposed the 1987 Montreal Protocol outright, arguing that 
the global South should be allowed some ecological concessions to favor development. Both 
nations refused to sign the treaty until the 1990 amendments moved to minimize the impact of 
transition on less-developed nations. “As a former senior official in India's Ministry of 
Environment and Forests observed, it was grossly unfair to expect low-income countries to 
‘adopt policies and spend money to solve problems created by other countries’” (Sims 1996).  
As developed nations cut their production and usage of ozone-depleting substances, less-
developed nations began to account for a bigger percent of the world's remaining emissions. 
China's surging economic growth positioned the nation as the world’s largest producer and 
consumer of substances that damage the ozone layer by 1996. Citing the importance and demand 
for ozone-depleting substances, “Chinese ministries agreed that China would not sign the 
[Montreal] Protocol until provisions were added to ensure financial and technical aid to China 
and other developing countries” (Zhao and Ortolano 2003).  
Working together, China and India argued that the developed nations that had done more 
to damage the ozone layer needed to do more to fix it. They also declared that developing nations 
had more immediate issues of poverty and disease to contend with, pressing the case for financial 
and technological transfers to make a reduction in ozone depletion economically viable for less-
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developed nations. Wealthy nations came to see that the control-based regulatory concessions 
offered under the Montreal Protocol were not sufficient—they would need to become tangible 
assistance in order for developing countries to forgo significant expansion in their use of ozone-
depleting chemicals (Zhao and Ortolano 2003). The initial estimates for the magnitude of that aid 
were substantial: $1.4 billion for China and $1.964 billion for India (Sims 1996).  
In the end China and India were successful not only in spurring the establishment of the 
Multilateral Fund, but also in increasing the dollar value of the Interim Fund. China and India 
made ratification of the Protocol conditional on “the commitment to raise the Interim Fund from 
US$160 million to US$240 million” (Kelly 2004).  
For India, fiery Environmental Minister Maneka Gandhi, was “instrumental in eliciting a 
more substantive concession of financial and technical assistance for ODS phase-out.” 
Nevertheless, Gandhi also faced domestic criticism for not using the pull potential of Southern 
leverage to extract even larger concessions from the North (Sims 1996).  
Zhao and Ortolano (2003) claim that although there were other justifications for China's 
ratification of the Montreal Protocol, the Multilateral Fund was the “dominant incentive.” In a 
virtuous circle, once China had signed the Montreal Protocol, the Multilateral Fund gave it a 
compelling reason to fulfill the treaty's obligations, as Article 5 nations that did not meet 
procedural requirements would be ineligible for Multilateral Fund monies. Chinese leaders had 
previously stated an interest in increasing production efficiency through technological and 
industrial growth. Acceptance of the Montreal Protocol furthered these goals, as the country 
would be unable to export commodities to party signatories if they contained ozone-depleting 
substances. Moreover, with the Multilateral Fund prioritizing efficiency above equity, China 
stood to convert its status as the developing world's largest user of ozone-depleting chemicals 
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into windfall gains. China's desire to increase the amount it received from the Fund spurred 
improvement in national implementation strategies (Sims 1996).  
Table 2.1 makes readily apparent the degree to which China benefitted from Multilateral 
Fund payments, and India’s uncontested status as the second most-benefitted nation. As of July 
2009, China had received $851 million from the Multilateral Fund—a full one-third of all Fund 
dollars (United Nations Environment Programme/GRID-Arendal 2010).  
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Table 2.1 The top recipients of Multilateral Fund tons approved for phase-out shows 
China’s clear dominance (Secretariat 2010)  
  Tons approved for phase‐out 
Country  Consumption  Production  Total  Percent 
China  113324  142565  255889  59.24% 
India  25756  31004  56760  13.14% 
Mexico  4763  12355  17118  3.96% 
Brazil  13403  0  13403  3.10% 
Indonesia  11211  0  11211  2.60% 
Thailand  7775  0  7775  1.80% 
Argentina  4365  2746  7111  1.65% 
Iran  6956  0  6956  1.61% 
Venezuela  2492  4418  6910  1.60% 
Malaysia  6446  0  6446  1.49% 
Nigeria  5810  0  5810  1.35% 
Korea, DPR  3349  1750  5099  1.18% 
Turkey  4495  0  4495  1.04% 
Egypt  4253  0  4253  0.98% 
Syria  3796  0  3796  0.88% 
Philippines  3335  0  3335  0.77% 
Algeria  2558  0  2558  0.59% 
Pakistan  2435  0  2435  0.56% 
Jordan  2223  0  2223  0.51% 
Colombia  1869  0  1869  0.43% 
Romania  1579  175  1754  0.41% 
Lebanon  1616  0  1616  0.37% 
Morocco  1324  0  1324  0.31% 
Chile  1228  0  1228  0.28% 
Cuba  588  0  588  0.14% 
TOTAL  236949  195013  431962  100.00% 
*This list only includes nations receiving more than $10 million 
(Secretariat 2010) 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Figure 2.1 A graphical representation of the previous table with China and India 
empahasized (Secretariat 2010) 
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CHAPTER 3 - The Work of the Fund  
How the Fund Works 
The Multilateral Fund is administered by a 14-member Executive Committee drawn from 
seven developed nations and seven Article 5 states. The Executive Committee is assisted by a 
Secretariat office in Montreal that manages day-to-day operations and makes recommendations 
to the Committee. The Fund Treasurer receives funds and distributes them to the Secretariat and 
implementing agencies.  
Financial and technical transfers occur as grants or concessional loans and are provided 
through four partner agencies. The World Bank is the largest disperser of funds, focusing on 
large-scale projects at the plant or national level. The United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization (UNIDO) provides plant-level investment projects, while the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) focuses on technical assistance and demonstrating feasibility. 
The fourth agency, the United Nation Environment Programme (UNEP), does not provide 
investment assistance, but rather supports institutional strengthening, such as developing 
National Ozone Units in nations with a small volume of consumption. There is also an allowance 
that up to 20 percent of a party's contributions may be delivered through their own agencies to 
eligible activities. (Secretariat 2010).  
The Fund’s stated purpose is to cover the incremental costs of transitioning away from 
the use of ozone-depeleting chemicals. Of course, “since the Fund’s inception, there has been 
debate on … what could reasonably be considered to be an agreed incremental compliance cost” 
(Kelly 2004).  
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Figure 3.1  The organization of entities overseeing the Multilateral Fund (UNEP/GRID-
Arendal 2010) 
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that even successfully recaptured dangerous substances before they were released. In Thailand, 
an initiative was created to replace chillers (air conditioning units for large buildings) with newer 
units (UNEP 2007). The Multilateral Fund has gone beyond helping consumers to at time spur 
upgrades among producers, such as when Chinese manufacturers received help switching to 
newer compressors for commercial refrigerators.  
 With many locations upgrading their cooling technology, it became imperative that the 
ability to maintain newer air conditioners exist. Recognizing this need, the Multilateral Fund 
agreed to support training for maintenance personnel, providing the human capital necessary to 
support the upgrades to physical capital that were being funded. Training projects have targeted 
both vocational educators (teaching the teacher) and direct education of maintenance workers 
(UNEP 2007). 
 Another major utilization of ozone-depleting chemicals has been as an agricultural 
fumigant. Funded programs have included supporting changes in tobacco cultivation in 
Macedonia and Malawi and vegetable production in Lebanon. In both cases the offending 
chemical, methyl bromide, was replaced through a combination of non-chemical means, and 
generally resulted in increased production—in the case of Lebanon, production grew sufficiently 
for the nation to actually begin exporting.  
Where possible, the Multilateral Fund has worked to employ market mechanisms to 
achieve greater efficiency at the lowest cost. Fund monies were originally awarded on a project-
by-project basis, but in 1997 China implemented a program targeting the entire halon sector at 
once. By employing a reverse auction where funds were provided to the firms willing to 
eliminate the most tons of ozone-depleting substances at the lowest rates, the project achieved its 
goals with a high success rate and spawned a wave of innovation in program implementation.  
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 In Mexico, the government worked with Multilateral Fund implementing agencies to pay 
the largest CFC (a powerful ozone-depleting chemical) manufacturing plant to cease production. 
Some of the equipment was repurposed, but most of the money simply compensated the 
production company for foregone profits. On the surface this would seem like a less-efficient 
project that could generate perverse incentives, but the plant in question was the largest in Latin 
America. Its cessation of production, combined with the transition of some plant equipment to 
production of substitute (and non-ozone depleting) goods had a significant effect on the 
availablilty of CFCs, the most egregious ozone depleting chemicals. The negative impact on 
supply of ozone-depleting substances and positive effect on supply of replacement chemicals 
caused the buyout to be specially commended by Multilateral Fund’s Executive Committee 
(UNEP 2007).  
However, the World Bank’s Montreal Protocol Unit has found that “investment projects 
alone are not sufficient to attain a significant reduction in [ozone-depleting substances] in many 
developing countries. Non-investment projects, including training, networking, institutional 
strengthening, and policy and regulatory-related activities, are equally important in ensuring the 
long-term sustainability of country programs.” As a result some Multilateral Fund monies are 
spent even very indirectly, such as on public awareness, encouraging nations and industries to 
meet Protocol deadlines so that they remain eligible for continued funding. Since 2001, the 
Executive Committee has awarded UNEP $200,000 per year to support public awareness 
campaigns (Kelly 2004).  
Other approved non-investment projects include Japan’s initiation of dialogue between 
China and Mongolia to prevent smuggling of ozone-depleting substances across their shared 
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border. The Fund has also supported “Green Customs Initiative” efforts to train customs officials 
in non-industrialized nations to reduce trade in goods of environmental concern (UNEP 2007).    
One strength of the Fund’s role as an information clearinghouse is that information on 
successful projects is disseminated, enabling them to be replicated in far-flung nations, as when a 
program targeting end-users of refrigeration and air conditioning that was initiated in Ghana and 
Georgia was later expanded to Costa Rica (UNEP 2007).  
The groundbreaking nature of the Multilateral Fund forced it to support not only projects 
directly, but also the support and development of national institutions, “a tacit acknowledgment 
of the need to develop basic institutional capacity in developing countries to address ozone sector 
matters.” Although industrialized nations questioned the appropriateness of such expenses, the 
Multilateral Fund has continued to insist that developing nations must play a larger role in the 
submission of projects, an outcome that will only occur with strong national institutions. (Kelly 
2004).  
Fund Amounts 
As of November 2009, the Multilateral Fund had received pledges of $2.55 billion in 
from 49 industrialized nations since operations began in 1991. Donations are solicited in three-
year cycles based on perceived needs for the upcoming period, but have remained relatively 
constant once beyond the initial period that covered the Interim Fund. (Secretariat 2010).  
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Table 3.1 Multilateral Fund replenishment amounts by three-year organizational periods 
(Secretariat 2010) 
Three-year 
Period 
Replenishment 
Amount 
1991-1993 $240.0 million 
1994-1996 $455.0 million 
1997-1999 $466.0 million 
2000-2002 $440.4 million 
2003-2005 $474.0 million 
2006-2008 $400.4 million 
2009-2011 $490.0 million 
(Secretariat  2010)  
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CHAPTER 4 - Evaluations of the Multilateral Fund's Success 
Importance and Impact of the Fund 
The most direct impact of the Multilateral Fund has been its contribution to the success of 
the overall Montreal Protocol in dramatically reducing the consumption and production of 
ozone-depleting chemicals. As of December 2008, ozone-producing substances had been 
reduced by 258,574 tons of consumption and 195,013 tons of production. Ninety percent of 
pledged commitments had been paid, allowing the Fund to support over 6,000 projects in 147 
developing nations. Furthermore, 143 of those nations have created National Ozone Units. The 
Fund has demonstrated the possibility of success when targeting only incremental costs. 
(Secretariat 2010). 
Although the Multilateral Fund has spent over $2.55 billion, from a global perspective 
those expenses have paid for themselves many times over by reducing ultraviolet radiation.  
UNEP has calculated that “implementation of the Montreal Protocol add up to some US$460 
billion in reduced damage to fisheries, agriculture, and materials worldwide. In addition, more 
than 20 million cases of skin cancer and nearly 130 million cases of eye cataracts will be 
avoided” (Kelly 2004). For the international community as a whole, the Multilateral Fund has 
been extremely cost effective.  
 
The Montreal Protocol has also made a significant contribution to slowing global climate 
change. Many ozone-depleting chemicals are also potent greenhouse gases. One class of ozone-
depleting chemicals, CFCs, have a climatic effect 20,000 times that of an equal number of 
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carbon dioxide molecules. A study by NASA found that “if CFCs had continued to increase at 
the growth rates of the 1970s, they would by 1989 have surpassed carbon dioxide in their gr 
eenhouse impact” (Benedick 1991). In light of the continuing failure of international 
agreements to specifically address climate change, it is fair to argue that the Montreal Protocol 
has had the most substantial effect on climate change of any treaty to date.   
At times the Multilateral Fund has generated externalities that positively affected other 
ecological issues.  In Jordan, a nation where water is precious, the phasing-out of agricultural 
methyl bromide reduced water usage to only 35% of the amount previously needed (UNEP 
2007). The elimination of ozone-depleting chemicals from production processes has also 
improved air qualities in the cities of some less-developed nations (Luken and Grof 2004). 
Beyond environmental impacts, the Multilateral Fund has helped firms realized positive 
profits by complying with the Montreal Protocol. Many agricultural producers and industrial 
plants alike have not been harmed by or seen changes as cost-free, but have instead realized 
economic profits for their businesses. In one example, a Pakistani shoe manufacturer received 
assistance to move away from using ozone-depleting blowing agents to form shoe soles. 
Customer reaction to the new product was so encouraging that the company used its own money 
to buy an additional extruding machine before the part of the project funded by the Multilateral 
Fund was complete (UNEP 2007).  
A positive institutional effect of the Multilateral Fund has been to draw non-
governmental groups together to address ecological issues. Although the World Bank’s foremost 
concern is poverty alleviation, not environmental issues, the Bank has played a vital role as a 
Fund administrator. Writing for the World Bank, Kelly (2004) notes that “the reputational risk to 
the Bank might have been greater had it refused to assist other UN agencies to implement a 
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global call to action to protect the ozone layer.” The Multilateral Fund has increased the 
institutional capacity and know-how of these organizations, benefits that will be more fully 
realized as other international environmental agreements are enacted.  
Finally, despite the positive externalities of its actions, the Multilateral Fund has 
remained true to its designated task of ozone protection—an environmental rather than a 
developmental goal. In fact, its goal of eliminating or replacing ozone-depleting substances was 
not intended to have any direct social impact (Kelly 2004).  
Shortcomings of the Multilateral Fund 
For all the success of the Multilateral Fund, it is not without flaws, thought most have 
been defended as reasonable given its pioneering nature. Bove (2003) writes that “by lacking 
guidance on organizational issues, much time has been spent sorting out the minutiae involved 
with being a prototype. These delays can be avoided with diligent planning in future 
international environmental treaties.” He notes that since the Montreal Protocol is the first treaty 
to give industrialized and less-developed nations an equal share in the dialogue “little ground has 
been gained in finding solutions to controversial issues that have arisen.”  
One continuous issue the Multilateral Fund has faced is financial inputs not meeting 
expectations, primarily donor countries that have not met payment obligations. This has also 
included nations paying in ways not anticipated by the Multilateral Fund, which has caused 
distribution and accounting problems. Phase-out goals have been harmed by the delays to 
replenishment and disbursement of funds. Financing provided as concessional loans also 
continues to be a lingering issue for the Executive Committee (Bove 2003). 
It has also been argued that developed nations may have never intended to fully fund the 
Multilateral Fund in the first place, creating it as a hollow promise to entice developing nations 
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into sign on to the larger Montreal Protocol. This has led some Protocol experts to believe that 
“developed countries slowed their contributions to the [Multilateral Fund] once they had met 
their initial objective of having developing countries ratify the Protocol” (Zhao and Ortolano 
2003). 
There are also concerns about the oversight of some project implementations. 
Specifically, some cooling and refrigeration projects have seen an excessively long lag between 
approval and implementation: “Thirty-five percent of approved projects in the refrigeration 
sector remain unimplemented. The foam sector and process agents sector each have not 
implemented sixteen percent of their approved projects, and the solvent sector has failed to 
implement twelve percent of its approved projects” (Bove 2003).  
Even the ecological record of the Multilateral Fund is not without fault, as some 
approved projects have yielded results that, although not harmful to the ozone layer, were 
ecologically damaging in some other way (Luken and Grof 2004). 
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Figure 4.1  Projections for the abundance of ozone-depleting molecules under subsequent 
revisions to the Montreal Protocol show the treaty’s impact on pollution levels 
(UNEP/GRID-Arendal 2010) 
(UNEP/GRID-Arendal 2010) 
 
 24 
CHAPTER 5 - Looking to the Future 
Future of the Fund 
The Multilateral Fund has reached the point where its most direct applicability is in the 
past. Having already addressed the most cost-efficient projects to reduce ozone depletion in its 
earlier years, the Multilateral Fund is reaching the point where remaining projects have lower 
cost-efficiency and are more painstaking to administer. Part of the difficulty in administration 
stems from the nature of remaining ozone-depleting applications as widely dispersed, rather than 
the concentrated projects that were the first to be funded (Kelly 2004). 
Nevertheless, the Multilateral Fund is positioned to continue operating for decades to 
come. As more chemicals have been added to the list of those regulated by the Montreal 
Protocol, demand for Multilateral Fund monies has only increased (Kelly 2004). Some of the 
most damaging chemicals, CFCs, were initially replaced by HCFCs, compounds that posed a 
smaller risk to ozone levels. However, concerns over HCFCs have prompted them to be slated 
for phase-out from developing nations by 2030 (Secretariat 2010). With this in mind the Fund 
may potentially have work for the next twenty years.    
Lessons From the Multilateral Fund and Applicability Towards Future 
Projects  
It may be tempting to pronounce the achievements of the Multilateral Fund, and indeed 
the entire Montreal Protocol, as a sign that international treaties addressing other environmental 
issues need only imitate the Montreal Protocol to be successful. Mexico’s ambassador to a 
meeting of the Montreal parties lamented that “the Multilateral Fund was the key to the Montreal 
Protocol's success. We're unable to create one for the Kyoto Protocol" (Leahy 2007). 
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Richard Benedick, the chief U.S. negotiator for the Montreal Protocol, does not 
seem worried about the lack of mechanisms similar to the Multilateral Fund: 
“The ozone treaty has defied the efforts of a generation of academics to produce 
connect-the-numbers guides to successful global negotiation. Although it is useful 
to analyze, in retrospect, successful negotiating factors and techniques, real 
negotiations are both richer and more treacherous than academic models. One can 
offer some “lessons” [from the Montreal process …] but there is no guarantee that 
things will work out. Impasses are not always destined to be resolved” (Benedick 
2007). 
 
While the Montreal Protocol has shown that successful international environmental 
agreements are feasible, the international community has been unable to replicate the success of 
the Multilateral Fund on other issues, most notably global climate change. This fact can largely 
be attributed to the simpler chemistry and economics of ozone depletion. Although the 
Multilateral Fund has shown that international environmental agreements with economic costs 
for some parties can be successful, is has not provided an easy roadmap to other similar 
mechanisms.  
 Aside from its role in securing the developing world’s participation in the Montreal 
Protocol, the legacy of the Multilateral Fund is likely to be its status as a trailblazing financial 
mechanism. The institutional know-how and capacity that it has established will benefit any new 
international environmental agreements. The Multilateral Fund is not the master key to 
unlocking future ecological treaties, but it has paved the way for future financial mechanisms—
and played a vital role in saved the ozone layer in the meantime.  
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